Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.

Keywords: Indivisibles; fairness; weak fairness; strategy-proofness

JEL-codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78

26 pages, First version: February 21, 2007. Revised: July 3, 2007.

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Published as

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, (2008), 'Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness', Review of Economic Design, vol 11, no 4, pages 321-338

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