Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2008:4: Detection Biases in Bluffing
Håkan J. Holm (hakan.holm@nek.lu.se)
Additional contact information
Håkan J. Holm: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender’s message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.
Keywords: Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Detection bias
18 pages, February 29, 2008
Full text files
WP08_4Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Iker Arregui Alegria (wp-editor@nek.lu.se)
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson (sune.karlsson@oru.se).
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2008_004This page generated on 2024-09-18 12:36:03.