Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2010:10: Free-riding on Communication: An Experimental Study
Ola Andersson () and Håkan J. Holm ()
Additional contact information
Ola Andersson: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Box 6501, 11383 Stockholm, Sweden
Håkan J. Holm: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects tend to wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free. Thirdly, the form of communication also strongly suggests free-riding.
Keywords: Free-riding; Communication; Coordination
18 pages, First version: September 1, 2010. Revised: March 3, 2011.
Full text files
WP10_10.pdf
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