Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2010:15: Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

Tommy Andersson (), Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman ()
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Christer Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman: CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Postal: P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.

Keywords: Multi-item auctions; unit-demand; excess demand; algorithms

JEL-codes: C62; D44; D50

15 pages, First version: December 17, 2010. Revised: June 28, 2012.

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