Albin Erlanson (albin.erlanson@nek.lu.se)
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Albin Erlanson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.
Keywords: Bisection Auction; Multi-item; Unit-demand; Sealed-bid
22 pages, October 7, 2011
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