Irem Bozbay ()
Irem Bozbay: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals’ judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
19 pages, November 14, 2012
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