Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2013:8: A Review of the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
Jens Gudmundsson ()
Additional contact information
Jens Gudmundsson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: We compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for indifferences as well as incomplete preference lists, in the sense that an agent may prefer remaining single to matching with some agents. We also introduce a new type of cycles and in greater detail investigate the domain of preferences that have no such cycles. In particular, we show how the absence of these cycles relates to the "symmetric utilities hypothesis" by Rodrigues-Neto (Journal of Economic Theory 135, 2007) when applied to roommate problems with weak preferences.
Keywords: Roommate problem; existence; stable matching; cycles
11 pages, April 5, 2013
Full text files
WP13_8.pdf
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