Martin Strieborny () and Madina Kukenova ()
Additional contact information
Martin Strieborny: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Madina Kukenova: International Trade Centre - Geneva
Abstract: Existing literature highlights opportunistic behavior as the main reason why rational agents underinvest in relationship-specific assets (the hold-up problem). However, a supplier would also be reluctant to undertake relationship-specific investment if she cannot observe financial stability or planning horizon of a buyer. By combining insights from research on relationship-specific investment and signaling role of financial intermediaries, we argue that a strong banking sector can alleviate these information asymmetries between buyers and suppliers. We empirically confirm this hypothesis by showing that industries dependent on relationship-specific investment from their suppliers grow disproportionately faster in countries with a strong banking sector.
Keywords: …nancial development; relationship-speci…c investment; growth
37 pages, April 24, 2013
Full text files
WP13_11.pdf![]()
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Iker Arregui Alegria ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_011This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:10.