Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2013:29: Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik H. Nielsen (), Jean-Robert Tyran () and Erik Wengström ()
Additional contact information
Ulrik H. Nielsen: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Postal: Öster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark
Jean-Robert Tyran: Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Postal: Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Erik Wengström: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Abstract: We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

Keywords: Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment

JEL-codes: C70; C90; D03

27 pages, September 11, 2013

Full text files

WP13_29.pdf PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-02-06 14:12:37.