Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2013:29: Second Thoughts on Free Riding
Ulrik H. Nielsen (), Jean-Robert Tyran () and Erik Wengström ()
Additional contact information
Ulrik H. Nielsen: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Postal: Öster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark
Jean-Robert Tyran: Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Postal: Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Erik Wengström: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.
Keywords: Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment
27 pages, September 11, 2013
Full text files
WP13_29.pdf
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