Werner Güth (), Vittoria Levati (), Natalia Montinari () and Chiara Nardi ()
Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Postal: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
Vittoria Levati: University of Verona, Postal: University of Verona, Dept. of Economics, Vicolo Campofiore 2, 37129 Verona , Italy
Natalia Montinari: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Chiara Nardi: University of Verona, Postal: University of Verona, Dept. of Economics, Vicolo Campofiore 2, 37129 Verona , Italy,
Abstract: In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
14 pages, May 19, 2014
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