Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2014:35: An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson (tommy.andersson@nek.lu.se) and Lars Ehlers (lars.ehlers@umontreal.ca)
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Lars Ehlers: CIREQ, Postal: Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada

Abstract: We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Keywords: least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithm

JEL-codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78

9 pages, October 15, 2014

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