Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2014:44: Overlapping Multiple Assignments
Jörgen Kratz (jorgen.kratz@nek.lu.se.)
Additional contact information
Jörgen Kratz: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result.
Keywords: Multiple assignments; overlapping assignments; sequential dictatorship; strategyproofness; compatibility
31 pages, December 22, 2014
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wp14_44.pdf
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