Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a combinatorial auction which is of particular interest when short completion times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of items when complementarity between the two may exist. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition. This condition also ensures that the set of approximated equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed which is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector.

Keywords: Approximate auction; approximated preferences; non-quasi-linear preferences

JEL-codes: D44

29 pages, June 22, 2016

Full text files

WP16_12  Full text

Download statistics

• Lund University, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Iker Arregui Alegria ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_012This page generated on 2024-09-17 17:57:09.