Ola Andersson (), Håkan J. Holm () and Erik Wengström ()
Additional contact information
Ola Andersson: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Håkan J. Holm: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Erik Wengström: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: We conduct a contest experiment to study if spread seeking and effort can be managed in a situation where participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory, we observe substantial investments in spread for the winner-take-all scheme. Both types of investments can be controlled with a three-level prize scheme. However, the control management is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. The winner-take-all prize scheme has many potential disadvantages including high spread and heterogeneous behavior compared to other schemes.
Keywords: Contest; Risk; Spread; Incentives; Institutional Choice; Experiment
64 pages, First version: December 30, 2016. Revised: January 28, 2019.
Full text files
WP16_37 Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Iker Arregui Alegria ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_037This page generated on 2024-09-17 17:08:41.