Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2017:16: Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application
Tommy Andersson ()
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.
Keywords: forced migration; asylum seekers; refugee assignment; matching; market design
6 pages, August 12, 2017
Full text files
wp17_16.pdf
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