Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics
No 2018:21: Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result
Tommy Andersson () and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Keywords: Characterization; House allocation; Strategy-proofness; Multi-object auction
JEL-codes: D44; D47; D63; D78; D82
Language: English
14 pages, First version: September 3, 2018. Revised: May 10, 2023.
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