## Working Papers,

Lund University, Department of Economics

# No 2018:21: Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited

*Tommy Andersson*
() and *Lars-Gunnar Svensson*
()

Additional contact information

Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

**Abstract:** We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.

**Keywords:**
Characterization; House-allocation; Strategy-proofness; Multiobject auction

**JEL-codes:**
D44; D47; D63; D78; D82

14 pages, September 3, 2018

**Full text files**

wp18_21.pdf Full text

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