Tommy Andersson (tommy.andersson@nek.lu.se), Dany Kessel, Nils Lager, Elisabet Olme and Simon Reese
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Dany Kessel: Department of Economics, Södertörn University
Nils Lager: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics
Elisabet Olme: Svensk Utbildningsteknologi AB, Stockholm
Simon Reese: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truthtelling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 66 of the 75 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).
Keywords: school choice; deferred acceptance algorithm; truth-telling; stability; replication study
Language: English
14 pages, First version: January 17, 2024. Revised: October 24, 2024. Earlier revisions: October 24, 2024.
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