Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolves the market design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including many of the classic applications, are part of the same unifying architecture.

Keywords: endogenous architecture; architectural components; architectural structure; general matching framework; weak equilibrium; non-manipulability

JEL-codes: C71; C78; D47; D71; D78

Language: English

44 pages, August 14, 2026

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