Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Discussion Paper Series in Economics,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

No 19/2011: Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market.

Pau Olivella () and Fred Schroyen ()
Additional contact information
Pau Olivella: Universitat Autonóma de Barcelona
Fred Schroyen: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a population of ndividuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve for the profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. First, we …nd that it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones). Third, we show that when the average man and woman differ only in risk aversion, gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.

Keywords: insurance markets; asymmetric information; screening; gender discrimination; positive correlation test.

JEL-codes: D82; G22

44 pages, November 2, 2011

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