Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Discussion Paper Series in Economics,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
No 21/2014: Hospital Mergers with Regulated Prices.
Kurt R. Brekke (), Luigi Siciliani () and Odd Rune Straume ()
Additional contact information
Kurt R. Brekke: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Luigi Siciliani: University of York, Postal: Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington,, York YO10 5DD, UK
Odd Rune Straume: University of Minho, Postal: Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Abstract: We study the effects of a hospital merger using a spatial competition framework with semialtruistic hospitals that invest in quality and expend cost-containment effort facing regulated prices. We find that the merging hospitals always reduce quality, whereas non-merging hospitals respond by increasing (reducing) quality if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements). A merger leads to higher average treatment cost efficiency and, if qualities are strategic substitutes, might also increase average quality in the market. If a merger leads to hospital closure, the resulting effect on quality is positive (negative) for all hospitals in the market if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements). Whether qualities are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the degree of altruism, the effectiveness of cost-containment effort, and the degree of cost substitutability between quality and treatment volume.
Keywords: Hospital mergers; Quality competition; Cost efficiency; Antitrust.
31 pages, June 30, 2014
Full text files
workingpaper.pdf
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