Gloria Moroni (), Cheti Nicoletti (), Kjell Gunnar Salvanes () and Emma Tominey ()
Additional contact information
Gloria Moroni: Dept. of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Postal: Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics, San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venice, Italy
Cheti Nicoletti: Dept. of economics, University of York, Postal: University of York, Department of Economics and Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, The United Kingdom
Kjell Gunnar Salvanes: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Emma Tominey: Dept. of Economics, University of York, Postal: University of York, Department of Economics and Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, The United Kingdom
Abstract: We revisit the economic effects of marriage, analysing its heterogeneous impact on the intra-household labour division following childbirth. Can marriage promote coordination of work and child activities between parents and a gender egalitarian division of labour? Using a marginal treatment effect framework, we find the average effect of marriage is to increase parental specialization and worsen the mother’s child penalty. However, we find differences across couples with varying resistance to marriage. While traditional couples (low-resistance) exhibit increased specialization; in modern couples (high-resistance) fathers have an earnings penalty and take more paternity leave, suggesting more coordination and gender equality.
Keywords: Cohabitation; Marriage; Specialization; Cooperation; Child human capital
Language: English
82 pages, November 26, 2025
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