Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Discussion Paper Series in Economics,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

No 12/2026: Revealed Normative Principles

Alexander W. Cappelen (), Shachar Kariv (), Erik O. Kimbrough (), Erik Ø. Sørensen (), Bertil Tungodden () and William R. Zame ()
Additional contact information
Alexander W. Cappelen: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Shachar Kariv: Dept. of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Postal: University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics, 530 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA
Erik O. Kimbrough: Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University, Postal: Chapman University, Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA
Erik Ø. Sørensen: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Bertil Tungodden: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
William R. Zame: Dept. of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, Postal: UCLA, Department of Economics, ADDRESS 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA

Abstract: When decision-makers allocate resources between anonymous others, with their own payoffs held constant, own-payoff utility maximization places no restriction on behavior; consistent structure in choices therefore reveals a normative principle. We employ a graphical budget line design to elicit allocations of real money between two anonymous others across many budget sets that vary the relative prices of redistribution. Choices overwhelmingly satisfy the axioms of rational choice, revealing individual normative principles. Subjects reveal a widely shared principle of impartiality (symmetric treatment of the two recipients) but hold heterogeneous views about the best symmetric allocation, ranging from Rawlsian equality to utilitarian efficiency.

Keywords: normative principles; distributive justice; impariality; equality; efficiency; revealed preference; constant elasticity of substitution; experiment

JEL-codes: C91; D63; D64; D81

Language: English

34 pages, September 15, 2026

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