Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Some kinds of corporate crime can be characterized as accidents, such as many types of environmental damage. These crimes are oflen expensive to deter because conviction costs are high and maximum fines are constrained by firms' ability to pay. The paper derives how enforcement costs can be reduced by switching from harm dependent to wealth dependent fines and by combining liability threats with regulation of firms' activity levels.

Keywords: ENTERPRISES; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

JEL-codes: K30; K32; Q28; L21

27 pages, 1996

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