Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sence that it is more costly for consumer to move in one direction, say on the left (towards 0), than to move to the right (towards1).

Keywords: CONSUMPTION; PRICES; INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

JEL-codes: R32; L13; L82

23 pages, 1996

Download statistics

• Oslo University, Department of Economics
• Ordering Working Papers
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mari Strønstad Øverås ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_035This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:44.