Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper compares the political support for a targeted and a universalistic welfare policy in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, low benefits may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to reduce benefits even further than zero.

Keywords: SOCIAL WELFARE; VOTING; SOCIAL POLICY

JEL-codes: D71; D72; D78; H53

30 pages, 1997

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