Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider competitive behaviour in sequential markets when current success or failure may affect the probability of future market opportunities. The analysis is conducted in a set up which may be interpreted as two private-value, sealed-bid, second-price sequential auctions. We demonstrate that whether agents price higher or lower than in the corresponding static context depends on the relative magnitudes of the 'winner's option value' and the 'loser's option value' of participating in the later market.

Keywords: AUCTIONS

JEL-codes: D43; D44; D92

28 pages, 1998

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