Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 31/2003: Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation
Karine Nyborg (), Richard B. Howarth () and Kjell Arne Brekke ()
Additional contact information
Karine Nyborg: Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Postal: Gaustadalléen 21, N-0349 Oslo, Norway
Richard B. Howarth: Environmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA., Postal: Environmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA.
Kjell Arne Brekke: Center for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo,, Postal: P.O.Box 1116 Blindern, 0317 Oslo
Abstract: “Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.
Keywords: Moral motivation; multiple Nash equilibria; green taxes
23 pages, August 10, 2003
Full text files
Memo-31-2003.pdf
- Published as
- Karine Nyborg, Richard B. Howarth and Kjell Arne Brekke, (2006), 'Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation', Resource and Energy Economics, vol 28, no 4, pages 351-366
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