Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 26/2008: Self-serving Dictators
Geir B. Asheim (), Leif Helland (), Jon Hovi () and Bjorn Hoyland ()
Additional contact information
Geir B. Asheim: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Leif Helland: BI Norwegian School of Managment, Postal: Nydalsveien 39 , N-0447 Oslo, Norway
Jon Hovi: Department of Political Science, Postal: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1097 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Bjorn Hoyland: Department of Political Science, Postal: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1097 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo,
Abstract: We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.
Keywords: Self-serving Bias; Experimental Economics; Dictator Game
19 pages, October 14, 2008
Full text files
Memo-26-2008.pdf
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