Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 21/2009: Strategic Use of Environmental Information
Geir B. Asheim ()
Additional contact information
Geir B. Asheim: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information. Keywords and Phrases: Environmental regulation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, hard information.
Keywords: environmental regulation; voluntary contributions; moral motivation; hard iformation
19 pages, September 10, 2009
Full text files
Memo-21-2009.pdf
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