Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 01/2010: Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets
Asheim Geir B. (), Max Voorneveld () and Jörgen W. Weibull ()
Additional contact information
Asheim Geir B.: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Max Voorneveld: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm,, Sweden
Jörgen W. Weibull: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, , Sweden and ´Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France
Abstract: This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles,and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.
Keywords: Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief
21 pages, December 7, 2009
Full text files
Memo-01-2010.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mari Strønstad Øverås ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_001This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:45.