Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 15/2011: Incentives for environmental R&D
Mads Greaker () and Michael Hoel ()
Additional contact information
Mads Greaker: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Michael Hoel: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator's choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D.
Keywords: R&D; environmental R&D; innovations; endogenous technological change
36 pages, April 18, 2011
Full text files
Memo-15-2011.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mari Strønstad Øverås ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:osloec:2011_015This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:45.