Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 13/2016: Unequal power and the dynamics of rivalry
Halvor Mehlum () and Kalle Moene ()
Additional contact information
Halvor Mehlum: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Kalle Moene: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: By incorporating positional dynamics into a conflict model relevant to battlefields and politics, we show that the conditions that induce regime stability can also induce hard conflicts. We show that in contests with incumbent-challenger turnover, i) asymmetric power across groups and positions may magnify conflicts; ii) more severe conflicts can occur with lower turnover of incumbents; iii) power can be self-defeating, as cost advantages can reduce payoffs; and iv) double inequality across positions and groups can maximize the graveness of conflicts and the social waste of resources. The propositions in our paper are contrary to the standard implications of static conict models.
Keywords: Contests; political stability; incumbency advantage; conflict and civil war
37 pages, September 23, 2016
Full text files
memo-13-2016.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mari Strønstad Øverås ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:osloec:2016_013This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:16:46.