Ratio Working Papers,
The Ratio Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of family ownership and control on executive compensation in listed firms during the period 2003-2008. The descriptive statistics show that CEOs in non-family-controlled firms have a significantly higher share of variable compensation than CEOs in family-controlled firms, they also receive remuneration in stock options relatively more often. The econometric analysis shows that family control and ownership concentration reduce CEO compensation whereas multiple-class shares increase the level of compensation. In line with the findings of previous research, firm size and performance are positively related to CEO compensation.

Keywords: Corporate governance; executive compensation; family ownership

JEL-codes: G30; L20; L21; L22; L25

25 pages, February 28, 2012

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