Thomas Broberg () and Alejandro Egüez ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Broberg: CERE and the Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87, Umeå, Sweden
Alejandro Egüez: CERE and the Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87, Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: Institutional structures may cause considerable inefficiencies in the use of energy. In this paper, we investigate the energy efficiency of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden to find out whether the type of ownership matters. More specifically, we investigate whether rental apartment buildings are less efficient than cooperative apartment buildings and whether public ownership has a negative impact on energy efficiency. A conceptual framework is presented to illustrate that such differences could be explained by the split incentive problem and deviations from profit maximizing interests. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that combines data from energy performance certificates with ownership data on residential units. The results indicate that cooperative apartment buildings are significantly more energy efficient than buildings with rental apartments. The results also indicate that publicly owned buildings have lower energy performance than privately owned ones.
Keywords: Energy efficiency; Energy performance certificates; Multi-dwelling buildings; Split incentives; Public versus private management; Profit satisficing
28 pages, April 19, 2017
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