Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 525:
Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

Eric van Damme and Jörgen W. Weibull ()

Abstract: Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. This is shown to corroborate the results in Kandori-Mailath-Rob (1993) and, under certain regularity conditions, those in Young (1993). The approach also yields a new refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is logically independent of Selten's (1975) perfection concept and Myerson's (1978) properness concept.

Keywords: Game theory; Evolutionary game theory; refinement; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C70; C72; (follow links to similar papers)

22 pages, December 29, 1999

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This paper is published as:
van Damme, Eric and Jörgen W. Weibull, (2002), 'Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities', Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 106, No. 2, pages 296-315

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